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A finding of the Australian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) literature is that
the time from prospectus registration to listing is related to the level of
informed demand. This makes the understanding of time to listing an
important matter. This study analyses the time to listing for 834 IPOs in
Australia over the period 1994 to 2004. The study finds that a shorter time
to listing is associated with higher issue prices, and the use of an
underwriter or Big 5 independent accountant. In contrast, IPOs offering
share options take longer to list. The significant role of variables associated
with the degree of certainty about a listing is consistent with informed
demand hypotheses about the time to listing.
I. Introduction
Much has been written in the finance literature over
the last 30 years about the pricing of Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) in Australia (Finn and Higham,
1988; How et al., 1995; Easton and Pinder, 1996; Lee
et al., 1996; Dimovski and Brooks, 2004, 2005), Asia
(McGuinnes, 1993; Huang, 1999; Tan et al., 1999;
Reber and Fong, 2006; Ma, 2007; Deng and
Dorfleitner, 2008; Hasan and Quayes, 2008; Lin
and Hsu, 2008), Europe (Cassia et al., 2004; Alvarez
and Gonzalez, 2005) the UK (Keasey and Short,
1997; Unlu et al., 2004; Reber et al., 2005; Hill, 2008)
and the US (Baron, 1982; Ritter, 1984, 2003; Beatty
and Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986; Tinic, 1988; Allen and
Faulhaber, 1989; Beatty, 1989; Benveniste and
Spindt, 1989; Welch, 1989; James and Weir, 1990;
Ruud, 1993). The consistent evidence from these
studies suggests that, on average, the issue price of the
shares of a company seeking to float is below the
closing price of the shares on the first day of listing on
a stock exchange. As such, the literature has drafted
the expression ‘underpricing’. Loughran et al. (1994)
report the existence of underpricing in 25 countries
around the world. Ritter (2003) reports underpricing
evidence from 38 countries. Updated studies are
reported on Jay Ritter’s website, http://bear.cba.
ufl.edu/ritter
Two highly influential papers in the IPO literature
are by Rock (1986) and by Beatty and Ritter (1986).
*Corresponding author. E-mail: tim.fry@rmit.edu.au
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Rock (1986) suggests the existence of informed and
uninformed subscribers to new issues. Where ration-
ing occurs, the informed subscribers (and likely more
influential) will crowd out the uninformed (less
influential) in the more underpriced and hence more
profitable new issues. The term used for this adverse
selection is the ‘winner’s curse’. To compensate the
uninformed investors for this winner’s curse and to
induce them to continue to subscribe to new issues,
firms, on average, underprice. Following Rock (1986),
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the greater the
uncertainty about the value of an IPO, the higher the
underpricing needed to attract the uninformed sub-
scribers. How et al. (1995) and Lee et al. (1996) both
test the level of informed demand by measuring the
number of days from prospectus registration to the
date of listing (time to listing) for Australian industrial
company IPOs in the late 1970s–1980s. Both studies
find a highly significant and negative relationship
between the time to listing and the level of under-
pricing. They suggest that this supports Rock’s
winner’s curse hypothesis in that issues that are filled
more quickly, plausibly have a higher level of informed
demand.
Thus, the previous literature demonstrates that
uncertainty matters in the underpricing of IPOs.
More specifically, it has been shown that the variables
associated with a reduction in uncertainty can be
linked to lower underpricing. This is also consistent
with the prevailing hypotheses about the role of
informed demand. The time between the issue of a
prospectus and firm’s eventual listing on a stock
exchange is also related to the level of informed
demand and is used in some studies (How et al., 1995;
Lee et al., 1996) as a proxy for the same. Given that
time to listing plays an important role in determining
the level of underpricing, it is therefore of interest to
explore if those variables that proxy for uncertainty
and partially explain the level of underpricing can do
the same for time to listing.
This is not only important from the investors’
point of view, as it ultimately implies the level of
underpricing that can be expected given a particular
set of characteristics/circumstances, but also poten-
tially of significance to firms seeking to float. It is in
the interest of the firm that it fills its subscriptions as
quickly as possible, thereby raising the needed funds.
Therefore, understanding the factors relating to time
to listing would allow firms to evaluate their chances
of listing quickly and potentially allow them to
reduce the uncertainty and increase the level of
informed demand. Thus, the aim of this study is to
examine which, if any, financial and nonfinancial
characteristics that proxy for uncertainty and
informed demand affect the duration of the IPO.
II. Modelling Framework
The simplest way of accommodating the role of the
‘uncertainty variables’ would be to directly estimate
their impact by modelling the logarithm of time to
listing (to ensure nonnegativity) using a standard
linear regression framework. By doing so, however, we
would be making several implicit assumptions. First,
since time to listing is a duration variable, the resulting
linear regression model would actually represent a log-
normal accelerated time model. This means that we
would be assuming that time to listing follows a log-
normal distribution, therefore imposing a parametric
form on the hazard/survival function. This approach
is extremely restrictive. Thus, we pursue a more
flexible approach in our modelling. The duration
modelling approach has a number of applications in
finance including firm survival (Holmes et al., 2008;
Siriopoulos and Lalountas, 2008; van der Goot et al.,
2008), the duration dependence of US stock market
cycles (Cochran and Defina, 1995), Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs) (Payne and Zuehlke,
2006), exchange rate regimes and currency crises
(Sosvilla-Rivero and Maroto-Illera, 2003; Prez-
Bermejo et al., 2008), monetary policy/interest-rate
spells (Shih and Giles, 2008) and the timing of high-
technology capital raisings (Lee and Lee, 2008).
Every company seeking to float begins its transi-
tion to being a publicly owned enterprise by releasing
a prospectus. This transition therefore begins with
an initial public IPO and ends once the subscriptions
have been filled. Thus, time to listing, T, is defined
by the duration of this ‘offering’ period or in other
words the period from the prospectus release to the
actual listing on a stock exchange. This duration is
a random variable with a cumulative distribution
function (cdf ), FðtÞ and a probability density function
(pdf) , fðtÞ. Consequently, the probability that a
company stays unlisted beyond some time t is given
by the following survival function:
SðtÞ ¼ 1 PrðT  tÞ ¼ 1 FðtÞ ð1Þ
The hazard function, representing the instanta-
neous exit rate, or in this context the rate at which
listing occurs, is given by:
ðtÞ ¼ fðtÞ
SðtÞ ð2Þ
It should be obvious from Equations 1 and 2 that
we could operationalize the hazard/survival function
in a couple of ways. First, we could assume that time
to listing follows a particular distribution, and then
parametrically estimate the hazard/survival function.
As noted above, the usual approach of fitting a
regression model to (log) duration times is
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a particular example of this approach. Second, we
may decide on a more flexible approach and use
a nonparametric method such as that of Kaplan and
Meier (1958).1 However, both of these approaches
would result in a solution that would be common to
all firms, which is not desirable.
Previous studies suggest that certain company-
related characteristics that proxy for informed
demand and/or uncertainty may serve to either
shorten or prolong the time to listing. For instance,
IPOs that have higher issue prices (Chalk and Peavy,
1987), and employ higher quality underwriters (Carter
and Manaster, 1990) and auditors (Beatty, 1989), as
well as those with high earnings potential (Koop and
Li, 2001), have all been found to be associated with
a lower level of uncertainty and underpricing.
Consequently, this implies that firms with these
characteristics should also fill subscriptions quicker.
Moreover, as hot issues in markets tend to correspond
to particular time periods and industries (e.g. Ritter,
1984; Brailsford et al., 2001, 2004), this also suggests
that, for any firm, the probability of staying unlisted
beyond some time t is affected by other factors and not
solely by passage of time.
As a result, the probability of staying unlisted (or the
rate of listing) for company i, in a time-period t and/or
industry j, is a function of some characteristics and time/
industry effects. Thus, the appropriate specification will
have to accommodate the potential inter-group hetero-
geneity, in terms of time period or industry group level
effects, and ultimately estimate the impacts of the
company-related factors. This gives rise to a shared
frailty model, which is an extension of the well-known
Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972):
ikðt xj ikÞ ¼ 0ðtÞk exp x0ik
  ð3Þ
Thus, we estimate a hazard for company i in group k,
where 0ðtÞ is the baseline hazard describing the ‘risk’
of listing associated with those companies for which
xik¼ 0. On the other hand, k stands for the group-
level frailty, which is analogous to random effects in
the regression models. Conditional on these frailty
effects, expðx0ikÞ represents the proportionate
increase or decrease in risk for set of company-
specific characteristics contained in xik (Clayton,
1978; Vaupel et al., 1979; Oakes, 1982; Clayton and
Cuzick, 1985; McGilchrist and Aisbett, 1991). The
corresponding survival function is given by:
Sikðt xj ikÞ ¼ S0ðtÞk exp x
0
ik
ð Þ ð4Þ
The frailties and their distribution have received
a great deal of attention over the years (e.g.
Hougaard 1984, 1986a, 1986b, 2000). Here, we
adopt the common assumption that frailties are
-distributed with a mean of 1 and a variance  that
in turn has important implications regarding the
interpretation of the results. Specifically, whilst in the
conventional model expðx0ikÞ would directly repre-
sent the unconditional effect of the covariates, in a
model with -distributed frailties its interpretation is
slightly more complicated. In fact, unconditionally,
the usual interpretation of expðx0ikÞ is only valid at
t¼ 0. As the time progresses, the effect of covariates
diminishes in favour of the frailty effect, with the rate
of decay related to the value of 2 (Hougaard, 1995,
2000; Gutierrez, 2002).
Thus, over time the companies become more
homogenous with only their group-level characteris-
tics distinguishing them. For example, for an organi-
zation in the energy sector as days of being unlisted
increase, it becomes less important whether it used
a Big 5 independent accountant or not, and more
important that it operates in the energy sector. This
implies that over a given time window of durations,
our set of firm-specific characteristics can explain the
durations of time to listing. However, eventually this
effect dies out and is dominated by the characteristics
of industry membership. This is consistent with the
informed demand hypothesis and the fact that after
enough time the informed demand effect is no longer
present and disappears.
Note that in cases where there is no significant
shared frailty,  is equal to 0 and Equation 3 collapses
down to the conventional Cox model. On the other
hand, if there are no significant frailty and covariate
effects, the baseline function is equivalent to that of
Kaplan and Meier (1958). This allows for a test of the
reasonableness of our modelling assumptions. In
terms of estimation, we follow the approach proposed
by Cox (1972), where the baseline hazard essentially
remains unspecified and the model is estimated by
maximizing the partial likelihood, although the
1Kaplan–Meier method:
S^ðtÞ ¼
Yk
j¼1 nj  j=nj
 
Let tj be the time at which listing occurs such that tj < t. Then nj is the number still unlisted just before time tj and j is the
number of listings at time tj.
2 The effect is constant if the assumed distribution of frailties is a member of positive stable family of distributions – see
Hougaard (1986b).
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procedure is extended to accommodate the inclusion
of the shared frailties. Thus, assuming that
!k ¼ lnðkÞ, we estimate the following:
ikðt xj ikÞ ¼ 0ðtÞ exp x0ikþ !k
 
As such, the !k’s are treated as coefficients of the
dummy variables identifying different groups and
estimated along with the ’s, for a fixed , via the
penalized log-likelihood (Therneau and Grambsch,
2000). As a result, the SEs of the ’s are estimated
conditional on ¼ ^ and thus inference should be
conducted conditional on the estimated . Note also
that we can obtain both, the estimate of the baseline
and the estimate of the frailty effects.
III. Data and Hypotheses
A total of 834 industrial and resource company IPOs
are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange from
January 1994 to December 2004. The primary source
of the data for this study was the Connect 4 Company
Prospectuses database. The summary statistics for
our variables are reported in Table 1. Time to listing
measures the number of calendar days from the date
of the prospectus to the day of listing.
The average time to listing in our sample is around
60 days, ranging from a minimum of 14 days to a
maximum of 246 days. Moreover, consistent with the
previous IPO literature, we include several proxies
for uncertainty, namely the issue price, use of an
underwriter or a big accounting firm, offering options
to underwriters and/or subscribers, as well as controls
for limited liability firms and market sentiment. The
issue price ranges considerably in our sample from
16c to $16 with the average of 75c. Given that the
issue price serves as a proxy for the uncertainty
associated with an IPO, we expect it to be negatively
related with time to listing. Firms with higher issue
prices are likely to be seen as less risky to the capital
market and hence should fill subscriptions quicker.
The underwriter and Big 5 independent accountant
dummy variables, on the other hand, relate to the use
of experts. The reputation capital of an underwriter
(as opposed to an issue not being underwritten) and a
Big 5 accountant (as opposed to a smaller accounting
firm) is expected to reduce ex ante uncertainty about
the new issue. This should, as a result, allow for the
issue to be filled more quickly. The majority of firms
in our sample used an underwriter (63%) and/or a
Big 5 accounting firm (55%).
In contrast, a smaller proportion of firms made
options available to subscribers (21%) or underwriters
(9%). The underwriter options dummy variable tests the
hypothesis that positive underwriter sentiment, by
accepting options to buy more shares, should also be
seen to reduce uncertainty about the issue, thus reducing
time to listing. Conversely, the subscriber options
dummy variable tests the Schultz (1993) hypothesis
that firms that issue packaged IPOs (those with options
attached to the shares) are typically smaller, younger,
have fewer assets, sales and earnings. As such, these
firms are then also ‘riskier’ and would be expected to fill
subscriptions more slowly. This can also be related to
the findings of Koop and Li (2001), who find that firms
with high earnings potential are associated with a lower
level of uncertainty and underpricing. Thus, this
‘packaged IPOs’ variable is expected to capture those
firm-specific characteristics that ultimately influence
the level of risk that the market associates with a
particular firm.
The market sentiment variable reflects the change
in the All Ordinaries Index from the date of the
prospectus to the date of the listing. We postulate
that the more positive (negative) the mood of the
stock market from the date of the prospectus, the
quicker (the slower) the issue is filled, which is an
argument along the lines of hot issue markets. In our
sample, on average, the market return is positive over
the time to listing (1%), although we again find
considerable variability around the mean with returns
ranging from 14 to 16%. Lastly, limited liability
companies represent the majority of our sample,
at 87% of companies.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for time to listing and the uncertainty related variables
N Mean SD Min. Max.
Time to listing (T ) 834 59.389 28.866 14.000 246.00
Issue price 834 0.7396 0.8495 0.1600 16.000
Limited liability (Y/N) 834 0.8669 – 0.0000 1.0000
Underwriter (Y/N) 834 0.6271 – 0.0000 1.0000
Options available to underwriter (Y/N) 834 0.0947 – 0.0000 1.0000
Independent accountant (Y/N) 834 0.5467 – 0.0000 1.0000
Market sentiment 834 0.0100 0.0428 0.1436 0.1633
Options available to subscribers (Y/N) 834 0.2146 – 0.0000 1.0000
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IV. Results
We begin our empirical analysis by assuming that
there are no frailty and covariate effects to estimate a
survival function using the Kaplan–Meier method.
This survival function is presented in Fig. 1.
Unsurprisingly, we can see that for the companies
in our sample the probability of staying unlisted is
fairly high in the early days. Furthermore, there is
also a very sharp fall in the probability of ‘survival’,
suggesting that the majority of companies were listed
approximately between 30 and 65 days from the date
of prospectus release. It can also be seen that staying
unlisted beyond 100 days is possible, but highly
unlikely which suggests that, in majority of cases, the
subscriptions were filled within 100 days of prospec-
tus release. The smoothness of the survival function is
indicative of a well-defined relationship between time
and the listing rate and it is evident that staying
unlisted is, as expected, negatively related to time.
Recall however, that we hypothesize that certain
company characteristics do play a significant role in
determining how quickly their subscriptions are filled.
Thus, in line with the hypotheses that we wish to test,
we estimate several Cox proportional hazard specifi-
cations. Common to each specification is the composi-
tion of the regressor matrix xik that contains company-
specific characteristics, namely the issue price, market
sentiment measure as well as several indicators for
whether a company is a limited liability company or
not; whether it used an underwriter and/or Big 5
independent accountant; and whether options were
available to subscribers and/or the underwriter. At
this point, it is important to recall the baseline hazard/
survival function is defined for xik¼ 0. Thus, in order
to retain the meaningful interpretation, we de-mean
the issue price so that the baseline hazard/survival
function refers to the case where the issue price is equal
to the average price.
In the first specification, we assume that there is no
shared frailty at any level and estimate the ‘usual’
Cox proportional hazard model. We can see from the
results reported in Panel A of Table 2 that most of
the effects agree with our hypotheses. As expected,
the model indicates that those companies with a
higher issue price tend to fill their subscriptions
quicker than those with a lower issue price. Similarly,
the limited liability companies and those who utilize
an underwriter and/or Big 5 independent accountant
are all more likely to be listed sooner than their
counterparts. This is broadly consistent with the
uncertainty reduction and informed demand effects
identified earlier. Moreover, our result regarding the
offering of options to subscribers confirms the
Schultz (1993) hypothesis, suggesting that those
companies that offer packaged IPOs tend to stay
unlisted for longer than those who do not. In
contrast, market sentiment and making options
available to one’s underwriter do not seem to play a
significant role, thus suggesting that the hot issue-
type effects that these variables’ measure are not
significant in determining time to listing.
Thus, so far we have ignored the ‘grouping’ in our
data and assumed that there is no group-level
heterogeneity among the companies in our dataset.
In the next specification, however, we explore the
possibility that there are industry effects, around the
broad GICS industry sector in which a company is
located. In other words, we allow for the companies to
be grouped into their respective sectors and postulate
that those companies that belong to the same sector
have a shared level of ‘frailty’. The results are given in
Panel B of Table 2. As can be seen from the results, the
likelihood-ratio3 test indicates that there is no
significant inter-group heterogeneity at the GICS
level. In order to explore this further, we proceed by
disaggregating the material’s sector into: (1) Gold; (2)
OtherMetals; (3) Diversified Resources and (4) Other/
Unknown, and re-estimate the shared frailty model.
The likelihood-ratio test, once again rejects the
existence of shared frailty even at this disaggregated
classification level. We thus conclude that there is no
significant evidence of sector-level effects. In other
words, companies operating in the same sector are
neither more nor less likely to be listed sooner than any
other group from any other sector, suggesting that any
hot issue effects in time to listing are not captured by
modelling industry sectors.
Lastly, we turn our attention to the possibility that
certain time periods are characterized by shorter
listing times than others. In order to examine this
hypothesis, we proceed by estimating another shared
frailty model where we allow for the ‘frailty’ to be
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10 60 110 160 210
Fig. 1. Kaplan–Meier survival function for time to listing
3 The test of ¼ 0 is a boundary test – the test statistic is calculated using a 50 : 50 mixture of 20 and 21.
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shared according to the year(s) during which the
issues were being offered. As shown in the results
reported in Panel C of Table 2, there is evidence of
significant year effects. This is consistent with the
presence of hot issue-type effects at particular points
in time. We now turn to discussion of this final
specification.
We first note that our results are remarkably
robust across all specifications, with covariates
retaining not only the direction of their impact but
also roughly the magnitude of the coefficient and the
level of significance as well. This adds confidence
regarding the validity of our results. Figure 2 shows
the estimated baseline survival function, S0ðtÞ which
is defined for those nonlimited liability companies
with an average issue price, which did not employ an
underwriter or Big 5 independent accountant and
offered no options to subscribers. Additionally, for
these companies there was also no change in the All
Ordinaries Index from the date of the prospectus to
the date of the listing. We can see that this type of
firm is fairly unlikely to list within the first 2 months
after prospectus release.
The biggest impact in terms of reducing time to
listing relative to the baseline is the use of experts,
both underwriters and independent accountants.
For instance, the impact of the reduction in the
time to listing of employing an independent accoun-
tant completely offsets the increase in the time to
listing that is associated with being a smaller, younger
and hence riskier firm. To provide a more precise
example in terms of the issue price, we find that
higher issue prices are associated with less uncertainty
and a shorter time to listing. The reduction in time to
Table 2. Estimated duration models for the time to listing data
Variable exp() SE p-Value
Panel A: Parameter estimates for the Cox proportional hazards model
Issue price 1.0826 0.0326 0.0080
Limited liability (Y/N) 1.5362 0.1639 0.0000
Underwriter (Y/N) 1.4338 0.1142 0.0000
Options available to underwriter (Y/N) 0.8968 0.1151 0.3960
Independent accountant (Y/N) 1.1820 0.0854 0.0210
Market sentiment 0.6582 0.5023 0.5840
Options available to subscribers (Y/N) 0.6666 0.0602 0.0000
Log-likelihood 4742.0301
Number of observations 834
Panel B: Parameter estimates for the model with industry frailty effects
Issue price 1.0818 0.0328 0.0090
Limited liability (Y/N) 1.5457 0.1686 0.0000
Underwriter (Y/N) 1.4376 0.1150 0.0000
Options available to underwriter (Y/N) 0.8948 0.1150 0.3860
Independent accountant (Y/N) 1.1852 0.0858 0.0190
Market sentiment 0.6623 0.5056 0.5890
Options available to subscribers (Y/N) 0.6660 0.0601 0.0000
 0.0012 0.0049
LR test (¼ 0) 0.0700 p-value 0.394
Log-likelihood 4741.9941
Number of observations 834
Number of groups 10
Panel C: Parameter estimates for the model with yearly frailty effects
Issue price 1.0999 0.0320 0.0010
Limited liability (Y/N) 1.6373 0.2309 0.0000
Underwriter (Y/N) 1.6467 0.428 0.0000
Options available to underwriter (Y/N) 0.8599 0.1115 0.2440
Independent accountant (Y/N) 1.3324 0.0999 0.0000
Market sentiment 0.5341 0.4236 0.4290
Options available to subscribers (Y/N) 0.6777 0.0619 0.0000
 0.0718 0.0334
LR test (¼ 0) 30.96 p-value 0.000
Log-likelihood 4726.5502
Number of observations 834
Number of groups 22
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listing of employing an independent accountant is
equivalent to an increase in the issue price of $3,
a large number relative to the average issue price of
75c in the sample. An even stronger impact is found
from the use of an underwriter, where the reduction
in time to listing of employing an underwriter is
equivalent to an increase in the issue price of $5.20.
V. Conclusion
The time to listing has been identified as an important
variable for IPOs in terms of being a proxy for the level
of informed demand. A problem in modelling time to
listing is that the variable of interest is duration data
for which standard regression modelling is generally
not appropriate. Thus, we model time to listing using
the class of models that have been developed for
duration data. Our results show that there is a set of
financial and nonfinancial characteristics about the
IPO that can also explain time to listing, and that most
of these variables also proxy for reduced uncertainty
and greater informed demand. The study also finds
that IPOs offering share options take longer to list,
which confirms the Schultz (1993) hypothesis. These
results are robust across three sets of models, a
standard Cox proportional hazards models and
models that allow for potential industry and year
effects. Our results support the theoretical models of
Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) around the
importance in reducing uncertainty about an IPO. In
particular, through an analysis of the use of expert
certification of underwriters and Big 5 independent
accountants, we show a strong certification effect in
reducing the time to listing.
References
Allen, F. and Faulhaber, G. R. (1989) Signalling by
underpricing in the IPO market, Journal of Financial
Economics, 23, 303–24.
Alvarez, S. and Gonzalez, V. (2005) Performance of
Spanish firms going public: windows of opportunity
and the informative effect, Applied Financial
Economics, 15, 1283–97.
Baron, D. P. (1982) A model of the demand for investment
banking advising and distribution services for new
issues, Journal of Finance, 37, 955–76.
Beatty, R. P. (1989) Auditor reputation and the pricing
of initial public offerings, The Accounting Review, 64,
693–709.
Beatty, R. P. and Ritter, J. R. (1986) Investment banking,
reputation, and the underpricing of initial
public offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 15,
213–32.
Benveniste, L. M. and Spindt, P. A. (1989) How investment
bankers determine the offer price and allocation
of new issues, Journal of Financial Economics, 24,
343–62.
Brailsford, T., Heaney, R. and Shi, J. (2001) The cyclical
behaviour of the IPO market in Australia, Accounting
Research Journal, 14, 17–34.
Brailsford, T., Heaney, R. and Shi, J. (2004) Modelling the
behaviour of the new issue market, International
Review of Financial Analysis, 13, 119–32.
Carter, R. and Manaster, S. (1990) Initial public offerings
and underwriter reputation, Journal of Finance, 45,
1045–67.
Cassia, L., Giudici, G., Paleari, S. and Redond, R. (2004)
IPO underpricing in Italy, Applied Financial
Economics, 14, 179–94.
Chalk, A. J. and Peavy III, J. W. (1987) Initial public
offerings: daily returns, offering types and the price
effect, Financial Analysts Journal, 43, 65–9.
Clayton, D. G. (1978) A model for association in bivariate
life tables and its application in epidemiological studies
of chronic disease incidence, Biometrika, 65, 141–51.
Clayton, D. G. and Cuzick, J. (1985) Multivariate general-
isations of the proportional hazards model, Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 148, 82–117.
Cochran, S. and Defina, R. (1995) Duration dependence in
the US stock market cycle: a parametric approach,
Applied Financial Economics, 5, 309–18.
Cox, D. R. (1972) Regression models and life tables (with
discussion), Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
Series B, 34, 187–220.
Deng, H. and Dorfleitner, G. (2008) Underpricing in
Chinese IPOs – some recent evidence, Applied
Financial Economics, 18, 9–22.
Dimovski, W. and Brooks, R. (2004) Initial public offerings
in Australia 1994 to 1999, recent evidence of under-
pricing and underperformance, Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting, 22, 179–98.
Dimovski, W. and Brooks, R. (2005) Dividend forecasts
and dividend payments of initial public offerings –
when zero means zero and no comment most likely
also means zero, Applied Financial Economics Letters,
1, 139–41.
Easton, S. and Pinder, S. (1996) Australian government
sector initial public offerings, Applied Economics
Letters, 3, 603–5.
Finn, F. J. and Higham, R. (1988) The performance of
unseasoned new equity issues-cum stock exchange
listings in Australia, Journal of Banking and Finance,
12, 333–51.
Gutierrez, R. G. (2002) Parametric frailty and shared frailty
survival models, The Stata Journal, 2, 22–44.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10 60 110 160 210
Fig. 2. Baseline survival function for time to listing
Time to listing for Australian IPOs 189
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:3
9 0
4 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
Hasan, T. and Quayes, S. (2008) Underpricing of initial
public offerings in Bangladesh, Applied Financial
Economics Letters, 4, 5–8.
Hill, P. (2008) Declared investment plans and IPO firm
value, Applied Financial Economics, 18, 23–39.
Holmes, P., Hunt, A. and Stone, I. (2008) An analysis of
new firm survival using a hazard function, Applied
Economics (forthcoming).
Hougaard, P. (1984) Life table methods for heterogeneous
populations: distributions describing the heterogene-
ity, Biometrika, 71, 75–83.
Hougaard, P. (1986a) A class of multivariate failure time
distributions, Biometrika, 73, 671–8.
Hougaard, P. (1986b) Survival models for heterogeneous
populations derived from stable distributions,
Biometrika, 73, 387–96.
Hougaard, P. (1995) Frailty models for survival data,
Lifetime Data Analysis, 1, 255–73.
Hougaard, P. (2000) Analysis of Multivariate Survival Data,
Springer, New York.
How, J. C. Y., Izan, H. Y. and Monroe, G. S. (1995)
Differential information and the underpricing of initial
public offerings: Australian evidence, Accounting and
Finance, 35, 87–105.
Huang, Y.-S. (1999) The price behaviour of initial public
offerings on the Taiwan stock exchange, Applied
Financial Economics, 9, 201–8.
James, C. and Weir, P. (1990) Borrowing relationships,
intermediation and the cost of issuing public securities,
Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 149–72.
Kaplan,E.L.andMeier,P. (1958)Nonparametric estimation
from incomplete observations, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 53, 457–81.
Keasey, K. and Short, H. (1997) Equity retention and
initial public offerings: the influence of signalling
and entrenchment effects, Applied Financial
Economics, 7, 75–85.
Koop, G. and Li, K. (2001) The valuation of IPO
and SEO firms, Journal of Empirical Finance, 8,
375–401.
Lee, Y.-J. and Lee, J.-D. (2008) Strategy of start-ups for
IPO timing across high technology industries, Applied
Economics Letters (forthcoming).
Lee, P., Taylor, S. and Walter, T. (1996) Australian IPO
pricing in the short and long run, Journal of Banking
and Finance, 20, 1189–210.
Lin, C.-T. and Hsu, S.-M. (2008) Determinants of the
initial IPO performance: evidence from Hong Kong
and Taiwan, Applied Financial Economics, 18, 955–63.
Loughran, T., Ritter, J. R. and Rydqvist, K. (1994) Initial
public offerings: international insights, Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal, 2, 165–99.
Ma, S. (2007) Information asymmetry and valuation
uncertainty, the determination of China’s IPO alloca-
tion procedures, Applied Financial Economics, 17,
271–84.
McGilchrist, C. A. and Aisbett, C. W. (1991) Regression
with frailty in survival analysis, Biometrics, 49, 221–5.
McGuinnes, P. (1993) The market valuation of initial
public offerings in Hong Kong, Applied Financial
Economics, 3, 267–81.
Oakes, D. (1982) A model for association in bivariate
survival data, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
Series B, 44, 414–22.
Payne, J. and Zuehlke, T. (2006) Duration dependence in
real estate investment trusts, Applied Financial
Economics, 16, 413–23.
Prez-Bermejo, F., Sosvilla-Rivero, S. and Maroto-Illera, R.
(2008) An eclectic approach to currency crises:
drawing lessons from the EMS experience, Applied
Financial Economics, 18, 503–19.
Reber, B., Berry, B. and Toms, S. (2005) Firm resources
and quality signalling: evidence from UK initial
public offerings, Applied Financial Economics, 15,
575–86.
Reber, B. and Fong, C. (2006) Explaining mispricing of
initial public offerings in Singapore, Applied Financial
Economics, 16, 1339–53.
Ritter, J. R. (1984) The ‘Hot Issue’ market of 1980, Journal
of Business, 57, 215–40.
Ritter, J. R. (2003) Differences between European and
American IPO markets, European Financial
Management, 9, 421–34.
Rock, K. (1986) Why new issues are underpriced, Journal
of Financial Economics, 15, 187–212.
Ruud, J. S. (1993) Underwriter price support and the IPO
underpricing puzzle, Journal of Financial Economics,
34, 135–51.
Schultz, P. (1993) Unit initial public offerings: a form of
staged financing, Journal of Financial Economics, 34,
199–229.
Shih, R. and Giles, D. (2008) Modelling the duration of
interest rate spells under inflation targeting in Canada,
Applied Economics (forthcoming).
Siriopoulos, C. and Lalountas, D. (2008) Firm survival and
time aggregation bias, Applied Financial Economics
Letters (forthcoming).
Sosvilla-Rivero, S. and Maroto-Illera, R. (2003) Regimen
changes and duration in the European monetary
system, Applied Economics, 35, 1923–33.
Tan, R., Eng, L. and Khoo, A. (1999) The effects of
offering method and trading location on the pricing of
IPOs in Singapore, Applied Financial Economics, 9,
491–99.
Therneau, T. M. and Grambsch, P. M. (2000) Modeling
Survival Data: Extending the Cox Model, Springer,
New York.
Tinic, S. M. (1988) Anatomy of initial public
offerings of common stock, Journal of Finance, 43,
789–822.
Unlu, E., Ferris, S. and Noronha, G. (2004) IPO under-
pricing over time: evidence from the UK, Applied
Economics Letters, 11, 5–9.
van der Goot, T., van Giersbergen, N. and Botman, M.
(2008) What determines the survival of internet IPOs?,
Applied Economics (forthcoming).
Vaupel, W., Manton, K. G. and Stallard, E. (1979)
The impact of heterogeneity in individual
frailty and the dynamics of mortality, Demography,
16, 439–54.
Welch, I. (1989) Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and
the underpricing of initial public offerings, Journal of
Finance, 44, 421–50.
190 R. Brooks et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:3
9 0
4 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
